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Jill R. Deans 
I was adopted and I am real. The child in Who's Afraid of 
Virginia Woolf? was metaphorical, so I don't think there's too 
much relationship there . . . 
—Edward Albee1 
Nothing belongs . . . 
—from Albee's Box2 
One of Edward Albee's most existential dramas, Box (1968) expresses 
succinctly the paradox of adoptive identity. While contained in the "box" of the 
theater, watching an empty cube set within the open "box" of the proscenium, the 
audience hears again and again from a disembodied voice, "nothing belongs." 
There and not there, both defined and empty, the "box" resembles adoptive 
subjectivity, present in absence. This study ventures to unpack the box, 
theoretically, to determine how adoption works, and how adoptive identity is 
necessarily wrapped up in performance. 
The point is not to link biography with its fictional representation, to 
insist, for example, that the metaphorical child in Woolf is Albee after all or that 
Box has anything literal to do with the expression of a troubled adoptee. Any brief 
biographical glance will establish the fact that Edward Albee was adopted by a 
wealthy Westchester couple, argued with his adoptive parents to the point of 
disinheritance, and channeled his alienation and their hypocrisy into his work.3 As 
Albee himself puts it: "one is always making art out of oneself. The art is the 
interesting thing, not the carcass."4 My project doesn't quite resonate with this 
high modernist assertion, however, since I do find the context of Albee's art 
"interesting," and more importantly, seek to trace broader social tendencies through 
dramatic literature. Specifically, I aim to expose adoption on linguistic terrain, a 
place where performance becomesperformativity, where visual "Acts" are distilled 
into verbal acts.5 Albee is particularly useful for this project not only because he 
employs adoption as a device, but also because his plays are widely recognized for 
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their potent dialogue.6 While Albee's language has been luring academics for 
decades, revisiting his early plays now can assist cultural critics investigating the 
relationship between identity and various social scripts, of which adoption is only 
one. I begin my reading by identifying substitution as a complex apparatus for 
social and personal identity shifts in Albee's work. After establishing substitution 
as a trope, I work through the notion of the text as a general locus for substitutive 
"acts," towards performativity in Woolf as a specific example of linguistic 
adoption. The result is an incipient theory for understanding adoption as a 
narrative act (rather than merely acting in narrative); for this discovery, Albee has 
been an invaluable test site for the study of adoptive subjectivity.7 
Now You See It, Now You Don't 
How is a subject recognized within the social text? When does invisibility 
yield to resolution? Conversely, how might controversial individuals disappear as 
they are subsumed within the status quo? Displaced "bastards," for example, often 
take the place of "rightful" children who never materialize. Can we identify 
socially, culturally, psychologically, the before and after of such legitimizing acts? 
Edward Albee questions the "now you see it, now you don't" rhetoric of adoption 
and il/legitimacy in terms of its broader social significance. Substitution is more 
than a convenient force to sustain the failing nuclear family, it's a pervasive 
mechanism for shaping illusions on a national scale. 
After evoking the Cold War climate that fostered Albee's masterwork, 
Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (1962), Matthew Roudane summarizes: 
The pot of gold at the end of the rainbow surely loomed just 
beyond the horizon, most Americans felt, even as Albee 
lamented in 1960 that the people of the United States have 
substituted "artificial for real values in our society," and that his 
theater was "a stand against the fiction that everything in this 
slipping land of ours is peachy-keen."8 
For Albee, the decline of "real values" (presuming a Golden Age deep in the 
recesses of the American past) is enacted through substitution—the ole switerchoo, 
evoking images of swindlers and con artists practicing slight-of-hand, a vaudeville 
trope that Albee may have gleaned from his adoptive grandfather and namesake, 
theater maven Edward Franklin Albee II.9 Albee Ill's chrome-plated Cold War 
edition of the shellgame is a reversal of the original, however, leaving us stripped 
not of cash, but merely and most profoundly of our integrity. His most insipid 
characters, those who play the game with increasing desperation, are (as I and many 
other critics have already implied) stage renditions of his own adoptive parents: a 
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brow-beaten white collar man and his vociferous, emasculating wife. They spend 
their stage-time in furious dialogue, carving up embittered, embattled illusions to 
feed to an audience that suddenly isn't sure if it's hungry (the dynamic of Albee's 
childhood writ large). 
Thus, not only have artificial values been substituted for real, but illusion 
takes the place of reality through and as a function of language and performance. 
The dialogue in an Albee play, however, does not simply generate fantasy, 
although many of Albee's scenes are fantastic or surreal. Words serve in more 
tangible ways to demonstrate the slippage between what is meant and what is 
communicated. When, in The American Dream ( 1961 ) for example, Mommy asks 
Mrs. Barker, "Are you sure you're comfortable? Won't you take off your dressT 
[my italics], she replies, "I don't mind if I do," and removes her dress.10 We can 
understand the "slip" in two ways, the more Freudian one and the literal one (which 
Mrs. Barker wears for the rest of the play). There is a gap between referent and 
sign, to evoke the poststructuralist implications here, that Albee isolates frequently 
with puns and equivoques to emphasize that language is not just a "metaphor" for 
reality, but a process of signification. Explains Jacques Derrida in "Signature 
Event Context": 
We would not assert, as one might be tempted to do, that semio-
linguistic communication acquired its title more metaphor ico, by 
analogy with 'physical' or 'real' communication, inasmuch as it 
also serves as a passage, transporting and transmitting 
something, rendering it accessible.11 
The problem is that in this "passage," some of the baggage can get lost 
along the way. Language thus remains substitutive in terms of its iterability, its 
constant-if-inexact application in the absence of sender and/or receiver. Sandy 
Petry, who emphasizes the importance of implied absence in Derrida's 
understanding of dissemination, explains further: "For Derrida, the 'logic of 
supplementarity' is that by which the essential and the unessential, the outside and 
the inside, incessantly replace and supplant one another."12 My reason for this brief 
foray into deconstructionism is to illustrate how, in this view, language itself 
enacts, on minute levels, what Albee expresses as a trope: the substitution of one 
subject (essential/inside) with another (unessential/outside). 
By turning to Seascape ( 1975), a short sci fi/fantasy parable of evolution, 
we can begin to compile the range of substitutions in an Albee drama to illustrate 
its tropic quality. Early in the play, Nancy reveals the emptiness of her and her 
husband, Charlie's lovemaking: "They don't talk of that: the sad fantasies; the 
substitutions. The thoughts we have."13 In this example, the physical and linguistic 
intersect in a place where subjects (children) are potentially conceived. The "play" 
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of language, "the thoughts we have" disrupt the reality of sexual play at the same 
time that it makes it possible to continue (through fantasy). This is important to 
establish in a stage "play" that broaches some very real issues about human dignity 
and the fate of the species in a surreal circumstance. In Seascape, Albee mocks 
outright humanity's low-grade fertility when Leslie and Sarah (two humanoid 
creatures who've crawled out of the sea) describe their reproductive capabilities: 
Sarah has laid over seven thousand eggs! They have hundreds of children, whereas 
Nancy and Charlie have only three. 
Albee wrote this play in the early seventies at a time, according to Elaine 
Tyler May, when "childfree" advocates defended the infertile and the voluntarily 
childless against social pressures to procreate.14 This playwright may be reacting 
more strongly, however, to his own adoptive parents's infertility, which during the 
thirties would challenge particularly his mother's womanhood in addition to his 
father's virility. After World War II, as Albee himself reaches maturity, public 
perception of the childless hardens further until the failure to embrace parenthood 
is equated with un-Americanism.15 Indeed, Albee, who himself will remain 
childless as a gay man, critiques the drive to assemble nuclear families at the cost 
of individual alienation (of both parent and child)—such pressures are, he infers, 
un-American in more fundamental ways, harkening back to the age of 
constitutional beginnings when strong, socially minded individuals forged 
democratic ideals. Never mind the obvious paradox in mourning the passing of an 
age when gay men, women, African Americans, etc. were denied basic rights; 
Albee's wry, affable grandmother characters appeal convincingly to the "good old 
days" when people had substance. In general, Albee's concerns are located 
nostalgically around the insistence that subject identity be accompanied by both 
personal agency and communal support, and that this recipe for integrity has been 
compromised, particularly by his parents's generation. 
While a lack of fertility symbolizes in his plays, as it did for his parents, 
a lack of vitality, merely having children (biological or adoptive) does not 
necessarily remedy this lack if parenting fails to include certain core values like 
love and liberty (and justice for all). Thus, in Seascape as inadequate as the human 
species may seem with regards to its procreative capabilities, it redeems itself when 
Nancy and Charlie explain how they protect their three meager offspring: 
"Well... we love them."16 Quality parenting supplants quantity. Leslie and Sarah 
seem ignorant of emotions; even if they feel, they lack the reason to qualify those 
feelings. Albee encourages the celebration of human potential with Seascape, 
allowing Leslie and Sarah to stay on land and make a go of it as rational creatures, 
but only after Charlie, the retired skeptic seems ready to participate in life, to 
become passionate about his existence. "I think the only thing to do is to do 
something," Nancy warns from the beginning, sensing that their lives have 
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stagnated, that their existence is all talk, as the play demonstrates."17 Substitution 
here initially denotes failure and impotence, but "evolves" as one couple learns to 
substitute reason with passion and vice versa, suggesting that both ingredients 
make us human. 
Throughout his work, Albee continues to equate sexual energy and the 
lack thereof with a more general life force, romanticizing a vague wondrous 
potential (characteristic of unfettered individualism) that many of his characters fail 
to achieve. George in Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? is the classic example of 
a man who "didn't have the stuff' according to Martha and her emasculating father. 
"George didn't have much . . . push," she continues, "he wasn't 
particularly . . . aggressive. In fact he was sort of a . . . FLOP!"18 Martha's 
criticisms are often framed to reflect George's impotence (deflecting her own 
sterility). "In a bloody repartee," writes psychoanalytic critic Harold Blum, "each 
partner is disparaged for a lack of virility and fertility, blame is projected, and the 
shared fantasy of parenthood is an insufficient bulwark against overwhelming 
feelings of injury (castration) and loss."19 Both George and Martha substitute 
verbal acuity for physical fertility, producing a child out of language to stand in for 
the heir they failed to conceive: an academic solution to waning vitality. 
This kind of substitution does not hold as much promise for individual 
freedom and growth as the Seascape example and typifies the dark side of adoptive 
strategies. Despite the fact that Albee doesn't see "too much relationship" between 
himself as adoptee and the "metaphorical" adoptee in Woolf Blum crafts a 
convincing reading of the play that assumes "the fantasy of adoption [as] the 
fundamental underlying theme" of Woolf20 Although his project examines 
adoption more as a subject in narrative, rather than as narrative, Blum explains the 
adoptive "relationship" in terms of the critical and literal apparatus of analogy (a 
form of substitution): 
the two couples form two sets of parents one associated with 
chromosomal biology, the other with known recorded history, 
both childless, and yet "parents." This is analogous to the two 
sets of parents of an adopted or foster child.21 
Honey, wife of the biology professor, gave birth with her hysterical pregnancy to 
an imaginary child. Martha and George, the history professor (keeper of records 
and "official" narratives), adopt the imaginary child and raise him (through 
narrative) in the absence of his biological parents (symbolized by his absence of 
a body). Nick and Honey's visit is a threat to George and Martha, initially, since 
Nick's glamorous field of genetics and high-tech biology supersedes George's 
worn-out history department. (I would add, along the lines of my focus, that 
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"biology," in this way, comes back to challenge the adoptive, narrative identity.) 
But Blum's astute observation points out, conversely, that Nick and Honey will one 
day "substitute" for the declining George and Martha not as victors in a custody 
battle, but as losers: as two more bitter, sterile people trapped in a marriage of 
convenience. 
The American Dream serves as a prototype for the kind of savage 
"exchanges" that made Woolf so controversial and popular, and creates the climate 
for Blum's potent analogies. Albee admits the kinship between the two plays once 
again in terms of the "substitution of artificial for real values."22 Whereas he is 
reluctant to acknowledge the presence of adoption in Woolf, he cannot deny its 
impact in Dream as a central device. Here the phrase "we want satisfaction" 
becomes a refrain for the "switches" or slippages that occurs throughout on at least 
three levels of substitution: from (1) the crass material exchange of a beige hat for 
its identical wheat one to (2) the random appearance of the Young Man who 
appears to take the place of his mutilated infant twin to (3) the final understanding 
of the entire play as the depiction of substantive human values swapped casually 
for a chronic obsession with material goods. The play invites a Marxist reading by 
demonstrating the economics of substitution through the commodification of 
adoption.23 Mommy and Daddy "buy" a baby from the "Bye-bye Adoption 
Agency" and when it appears to be an imperfect substitution for a natural child, 
they dismember it out of frustration. The main action centers around their desire 
to seek restitution, to obtain a replacement for this inferior product. 
Of course, this core action is absurd; not only is the physical violence 
horrific and grotesque, but owning people has been technically illegal in this 
country since the Thirteenth Amendment. The casual enactment of these atrocities, 
however, signals an examination of the adoption "business" which, many critics 
claim, still turns a profit today, despite legal and ethical restrictions. "Headlines 
in 1980s newspapers," notes anthropologist Judith Modell, "suggest this is a market 
worthy of attention: 'Baby-marketing a big business'; 'Lawyer profits from unwed 
mothers."'24 Modell is quick to point out, however, that the case for "independent 
adoptions" which require high fees for doctors and lawyers (versus state-regulated 
adoptions which are technically "free") reassure some social welfare agents that the 
purchased child will be safe: "People do value what they have invested in, and 
payments can be 'legitimized as symbolic expressions of sentimental concern' by 
adoptive parents."25 Mommy and Daddy demonstrate the potential emptiness of 
such a rationalization when they destroy their "property" without hesitation, and 
with the full expectation of a refund. They expose a commodification principle that 
may easily explain much of the domestic violence committed against adopted 
children in a capitalist-driven society. Although adoption and foster care are 
important institutions through which a battered child can escape abusive biological 
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parents, extreme cases like the 1989 tragedy of Lisa Steinberg, tortured and killed 
by (illegally) adoptive parents Joel Steinberg and Hetta Nusbaum, expose the 
violence enabled by the sad assumption that the adoptee is not a real child, but an 
acquisition at the mercy of its owner.26 In the words of Danielle Maree Baker, an 
adoptee who survived the abuse inflicted by her adoptive parents: "Adoptees don't 
get born, they get 'gotten'. I felt procured like furniture, like a commodity."27 
By further magnifying the process of commodification through both 
Marxist and poststructuralist lenses, we can see how subject identity is a product 
of ideological forces and signification. The oft-critiqued hat anecdote in Dream, 
for example, portrays the mounting tension between pluralistic and monologic 
forces of culture production as well as the "play" between referent and sign that 
actively constitutes identity. Mommy is sold a "lovely little beige hat," but when 
she runs into her ladies club chairman (none other than Mrs. Barker, the social 
welfare agent), she's told the hat is "wheat-colored." Returning to the store in a 
rage, Mommy exchanges the hat for another that is clearly identical, but guaranteed 
to be "beige." Later, after Mommy's gotten "satisfaction" for her purchase, Mrs. 
Barker insists that her own hat (which is supposed to be the same as Mommy's hat) 
is "cream" colored, ^stabilizing the whole picture all over again. 
While there is obvious fun to be had in linking the reality of the hat with 
a descriptive word, one might also read the story as a critique of racial and cultural 
ideology. On the one hand, people (objectified as hats) come in all different 
shades. On the other hand, Mommy's different hats are really all the same, aren't 
they? Scrutinous Mommy and Mrs. Barker argue over the color of a hat, when 
really the store only stocks one shade, and this shade is relatively pale, no matter 
how you look at it. The store, therefore, is really an outlet for the dominant culture, 
distributing "wheat" colored hats to cover the even more diverse heads of America. 
Each hat, firmly situated, shades and objectifies the living entity beneath it—when 
Mommy's hat is questioned, her sense of belonging (in the Ladies' Club) is shaken. 
Her project becomes utter conformity. 
The Young Man who appears at the end of the play, epitomizes this 
objectification, illustrating how extreme conformity can lead ironically to a lack of 
belonging, a void signified by the empty adoption recounted earlier in the play. 
Apparently perfect, the Young Man is blatantly mechanical in his desire to sell his 
"services." Having "done some modeling," he is supremely qualified at everything 
and nothing at all. As such, this transparent worker/machine easily becomes the 
scapegoat for all the other characters's social and emotional sterility. He is both 
the embodiment of loss and the surrogate for Mommy and Daddy's mutilated child: 
"We were separated when we were still very young," he explains: 
. . . since that time I have been unable to see anything, anything, 
64 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
with pity, with affection . . . with anything but . . . cool 
disinterest . . . I have been drained, torn 
sunder . . . disemboweled. I have now, only my person . . . my 
body, my face . . . I accept the syntax around me, for while I 
cannot relate . . . I know I must be related to?% 
Conforming to a vapid and vacuous dominant culture, the Young Man is able to 
"accept the syntax" that both defines and destroys him. This speech comes on the 
heels of Grandma's historical narrative of Mommy and Daddy's failed parenthood. 
The Young Man's narrative serves to explicate the former, resembling the process 
of genealogy—quite literally—as Michel Foucault describes it in "Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History": 
The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language 
and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting 
the illusion of substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual 
disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus 
situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task 
is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process 
of history's destruction of the body.29 
In the absence of the mutilated infant's body, the Young Man's shining vacant 
physique illuminates the previous adoption debacle; it traces with surgical precision 
the cruel process of signification until it arrives at a convincing "origin" —the 
conclusion that the Young Man and the infant were twins separated at birth. Their 
"rupture" leads to the demise of the infant and the survival of the Young Man 
whose presence now supplants the former. 
Blonde-haired, blue-eyed, wheat-skinned, the Young Man is a clear 
indictment of our nation's superficiality. Later, in Woolf, a drunken George and 
Martha describe their son as blonde-eyed, blue-haired, a freakish adaptation of the 
original. In both cases, the child hardly seems real, but more an entity within an 
schema, a notion picked apart and deconstructed. Even in the most pro-adoption 
narratives, the subjectivity of the acquired (illegitimate) child is endangered as his 
or her identity becomes re-expressed in the new terms of legitimacy .30 Fundamental 
liberties—agency and the freedom of self-awareness—must be violated first to 
transmute an affiliative bond into a filiative one. A certain masquerade must ensue 
to maintain an adoption. 
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Counting the Kids 
HE {Mildly curious tone; offhand) 
How many children do we have? 
SHE {Smiles; cheerful) 
Three. 
{HE just stands there. Her voice takes on a tiny edge) 
Three! 
{HE just stands there. Not believing it) 
Four? 
(HE just stands there. Reassuring herself) 
Three! 
(HE just stands there. Quite incredulous) 
Four!? 
(SHE exits. HE just stands there)^ 
According to Brian Way (who takes his cue from Martin Esslin): "A 
writer's vision is absurd when the arbitrary, the disconnected, the irrelevant, non-
reason, are seen to be the main principle or non-principle of the universe."32 Scene 
Sixteen of Edward Albee's Vaudeville Counting the Ways (1975), above, is 
accordingly absurd, undermining a fundamental certainty—number of children—in 
the midst of a casual domestic exchange. As a result, this scene has both verbal 
and visual appeal: SHE counts her children expressively and with growing anxiety; 
HE, in his stillness and odd silence, is her blatant foil. Though the comedy is spare 
and economical, the social commentary is extravagant. Albee conjoins the subtle 
and the obvious, the fact that this nuclear family has atomized, to make us laugh 
at the legitimate, to make us question the so-called norm. Way, at this point, would 
suggest that Albee is no longer a true Absurdist because "[he] still believes in the 
validity of reason—that things can be proved, or that events can be shown to have 
definite meanings—and, unlike Beckett and the others, is scarcely touched by the 
sense of living in an absurd universe."33 According to Albee, our problem is not 
that the world is random and baseless, but that we've lost our grip on the substance 
that enables us to count the kids, so to speak. 
Later, in Scene Eighteen, SHE returns to confirm that they do, indeed, 
have three children, per her initial response, revealing that HE may have conceived 
her doubt and the possibility of a forth child with his pregnant pause. In this case, 
a child is born, if briefly, from the spaces between words, demonstrating how easy 
it is to generate a subjective reality and subject identity. The "fourth child" does 
not exist off-stage, of course, as the other children presumably do, but on-stage the 
possible child flickers in the unstable dialogue. Language and its companion 
silence thus embodies the absurd (the possibility of a "baseless" or wholly 
discursive subjectivity) a point that Albee exploits, however, in order to recover 
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something more meaningful and substantive about identity. 
The "fourth child" here serves as an example of "presence in 
absence"—to evoke Sartre's enigmatic use of the phrase—that one could trace 
roughly across Albee's work from the empty picture frames in The Zoo Story, to 
the ghost of a child dismembered in The American Dream, George and Martha's 
verbal child in Woolf, the unseen Alice of Tiny Alice, the unnamed fear in A 
Delicate Balance, the aphasie girl in Listening, and so on to the silent son in Three 
Tall Women. I borrow from Sartre more generally, however, to recall Derrida and 
his contention with J.L. Austin's speech-act theory. Austin's 1955 lecture series 
How to Do Things With Words (with all its attending debate) is the obvious place 
to begin making a case for the use-value of adoption read as a performative.34 The 
act of adoption—to adopt, I adopt you—begins and ends in language even if it is 
accompanied by a physical shift between families. Adoption would qualify, in fact, 
as an "explicit performative," a category of usage that even Austin weakens with 
more exceptions than rules, but none-the-less establishes some clear examples of 
words that act: when you "bet" or "promise" or say "I do" at a marriage ceremony, 
you elicit what he calls "illocutionary" force, producing social moments (that can 
succeed or fail according to certain criteria like context and intention). Such force 
embedded in the rhetoric of adoption, as an explicit performative, enables the 
fantasy of the nuclear family to continue even in the face of infertility. Whereas 
the word "birth" can only refer to or describe an act (be it a significant one), the 
phrase "I hereby adopt . . . " doesn't refer directly to anything, but actually makes 
(given the proper context and intention, etc.) a legitimate child through language. 
Both Sandy Petry and Stanley Fish point out that Derrida had a bigger 
problem with Austin's conception of how language operates as language than with 
the notion that speech can act.35 This has to do with that iterable quality of 
language I discussed earlier which necessitates a degree of absence to operate 
discursively. If all language depends upon absence, how can descriptive or 
"locutionary" language refer so directly, claiming the pure presence of the 
signified? The impossibility of this essential union between referent and signifier 
in descriptive language, leads to the conclusion that all language must act. 
In this sense, all text possesses adoptive potential; once its language is in 
play, it can venture out into the world—"orphaned speech" as Fish puts it, available 
for interpretation (i.e. adoption). Drawing from Jonathan Culler's line, "Some texts 
are more orphaned than others," Fish investigates the degree to which text is 
mediated by the presence or absence of an "origin," "context," and "interpretation," 
only to conclude that: "all texts are equally and radically orphaned in the sense that 
no one of them is securely fastened to an independently specifiable state of 
affairs."36 As for the term iterable, Fish finds it analogous to readable, since all 
text is separated from pure "origin" and must be deciphered. While all text may 
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be "equally orphaned," however, the subjects of language remain at varying 
removes from their referential beginnings. This may account for the potency or 
presence that lingers in the performative sense of adoption. Returning to Sartre, 
we can understand this "sense" by linking performatives with the force of visual 
images. 
In an essay about Roland Barthes and the force or punctum embedded 
in the photographic image, Michael Halley discusses Sartre's book L'Imaginaire 
which "proceeds to characterize the 'image' by comparing it with, appropriately 
enough, the 'sign.' The 'most important distinction' he makes between the two," 
writes Halley, "is that the image represents presence in absence and the sign 
absence."37 This idea has developed since Sartre's earlier work, Imagination, 
which declares that: "An image is an act, and not some thing" only in conclusion.38 
It might be useful to connect outright image and act by suggesting that the 
"presence in absence" which characterizes image, also characterizes so-called 
performative language (or language that acts), whereas absence, as Sartre, Derrida 
and Fish all argue, necessarily characterizes language in general. 
I ask whether that same presence in absence exists in the performative 
sense of adoption and in resulting adoptive subjectivity. For while the adoptee is 
displaced, there remains a trace, an "original" sense of identity, and even after 
placement there exists a glaring presence in the space left by that first identity. The 
scripting of the adopted self requires both acknowledgment and denial of a prior 
self, a duality that shifts one way or the other depending on the adoptee's current 
sense of belonging. The trope of substitution is in this way complicated by the 
significant traces that mark the process of legitimization. Consider in Albee, for 
example, the function of those empty picture frames in The Zoo Story (1959), 
nestled, amidst: "a cup, a saucer, a drinking glass . . . eight or nine books, a pack 
of pornographic playing cards . . . ."39 There is clearly an absence recorded by 
those frames, and yet, juxtaposed to the very presence of some common and not-
so-common items, the frames imply a presence too. When Jerry, the hapless 
"stray" explains to Peter, the hopeless conformist, that he doesn't have any pictures 
to put in the frames, Peter works to fill the obvious gaps with "legitimate" relations: 
"Your parents . . . perhaps . . . a girl friend "40 Both of Jerry's parents are dead; 
girls are another matter. Homosexual "for eleven days" as an adolescent, Jerry 
finds himself unable to sustain a relationship with a woman or a man. Because 
there are two frames, the audience might logically favor the absent parent theory, 
but given Jerry's bisexuality, the two spaces could imply the girlfriend and 
boyfriend that Jerry never had. Love— from parents or romantic partners—is 
missing and the absence framed nostalgically in a way that emphasizes the 
presence of his loss. 
In terms of adoption, that potent emptiness symbolizes the alienation of 
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someone outside of historical connections, outside the discursive realm that 
constructs identity. In this way, Jerry and all his neighbors—boardinghouse 
transients from the "colored queen" next door to the disembodied voice sobbing 
upstairs—are social orphans yet to be placed within confirming structures, 
relationships or families whose rhetoric of love would legitimize or embody them. 
But they still exist, disembodied, even in their absence they are present. Albee's 
family dramas illustrate overtly the problem of belonging for adoptees caught 
between "original" (inner) identity and adoptive (observed) identity—a presence 
in absence in terms of image but also in terms of language. 
To ease his sense of alienation, Jerry attempts to escape from the zoo-like 
boardinghouse to explore Peter's stable, middle-class model family, complete with 
wife, two daughters, two cats and two parakeets (each pair suitable for framing). 
This play infers, however, that the "model family" structure is as or even more 
dangerous than individual alienation because it serves to mask alienation without 
remedying it. Adoption appears safe, a system of refuge, as I indicate earlier, for 
abused and neglected children. Even Albee, regarding the "adoption" of his three 
cats, notes: 
The [Greenwich Village Humane] League people go out and 
look for abandoned cats on the street, and save them from the 
awful things that happen to homeless kittens in New York, like 
being tossed into bonfires by mean kids . . .41 
His offhand remark reminds the reader that to take in these vulnerable cats is to 
save them from the brutality of a harsh, uncaring world. And yet virtually all of 
Albee's family dramas depict brutality inside the home. Mommy and Daddy in 
The American Dream, George and Martha in Woolf, Tobias and Agnes in A 
Delicate Balance, the entire cast of All Over are very much like the "mean kids" 
who toss homeless innocents into their bonfire of greed and pain. In this way, 
Albee dismantles the barrier between so-called civilization and the ravages of 
man's animalistic nature, a project he begins in The Zoo Story. Jerry cannot fully 
exchange viewpoints with Peter, however, except through his own death 
whereupon he trades his liminal status for a full leap into stable emptiness (to join 
ultimately the void signified in the picture frames), while Peter, as an agent of 
Jerry's death, gleans that the living world is far less stable than he'd thought. 
Modern society may appear safe in its institutions of family and community, but 
the volatile reality of adoption and exchange illustrates that it is anything but 
secure. 
This may be because the family in each case is a cultural performance, 
and not necessarily an affirming reality. In the introduction to his 1968 volume on 
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American Kinship, cultural anthropologist David M. Schneider establishes some 
basic connections between culture and language which premise his analysis of 
kinship: 
Insofar as a word is the name for something, and insofar as the 
word names among many other things a cultural unit or 
construct, one might conclude that culture consists of the 
language; that is, the vocabulary, grammar, and syntax, or the 
words and their definitions and their relationships to each 
other.42 
Since the advent and growth of cultural studies, as a more formal (inter)discipline, 
Schneider's statement seems hardly new. He complicates this issue, however, by 
privileging the biogenetic or procreative understanding of kinship as a model in 
American culture. Identity can be constructed, but it must be based on the example 
of biology to be recognized in our society—a certain valued "syntax" will evoke 
the notion of "American Dream." Rallying around its "syntax," the family is able, 
in the words R.D. Laing: "to serve as a defense or bulwark against total collapse, 
disintegration, emptiness, despair, guilt, and other terror."43 What happens, 
however, when that structure shifts, grows or redefines itself as it must with 
adoption? Though Schneider doesn't fully address adoption as a category, by 
reminding us that all kinship structures (even those premised on biology or 
genetics) are conferred in language, his study indicates that adoptive kinship can 
be equally sustaining.44 The point is that nurturing elements of kinship are easily 
transformed into "naturalizing" factors by the rhetoric of legitimacy and the nuclear 
family, a rhetoric that reflects the power of love and politics and occurs in 
language to stabilize the "terror" of anomaly. In short, adoption can substitute for 
defective or uncooperative biology. 
Later, in his chapter "A Relative Is a Person," Schneider explains 
individual "cultural units" called "people": "These units are different from other 
kinds in that they are defined by American culture as being able to do something 
or to act" (author's italics).45 Hence relatives in this biogenetically modeled family 
"act" in accordance with or against certain "roles" or expected patterns of behavior. 
In Families We Choose, a book about gay and lesbian kinship, Kath Weston 
critiques Schneider's dependence on this model, especially in terms of the "roles" 
it implicates.46 If heterosexual genealogy staves off anomaly, homosexual kinship 
then encourages "deviance." It's worth keeping Weston's qualifications of 
Schneider in mind, when we examine Albee. Since Albee is a gay adoptee, his 
view of American kinship may be valanced by a critique of heterosexual biogenesis 
as a model for relatedness. How stable is the family as an institution as long as it 
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is pervaded by these "people" who "act" and/or act out? 
While Weston explores what gays and lesbians are doing to disrupt the 
model, Albee critiques the nuclear family from within. What exactly can "people" 
do to invent their roles? How far can they go in the construction of their identities 
(or the identities of others)? These are the key questions entertained by Albee in 
Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? as a parody of so-called "normative" kinship. 
Crying Woolf 
There are very few things in this world that I am sure 
of. . . nationalism boundaries, the level of the ocean, political 
allegiances, practical morality . . . but the one thing in the whole 
stinking world that I am sure of is my partnership, my 
chromosomological partnership in the . . . creation of 
our . . . blond-eyed, blue-haired . . . son.47 
Woolf "is a play about conception and deception. It is also one of Albee's 
more significant adoption plays, as Blum has pointed out, since sterility, seemingly 
endemic to his haute bourgeoisie, forces characters to invent their children. The 
"partnership" that George describes above is far less "chromosomological" than 
linguistic. He and Martha have conspired verbally to constitute their son even 
before their post-party gathering with Nick and Honey. This discursive form of 
adoption exaggerates the defining practice of "citing" an individual in order to 
recognize him or her within a socially sanctioned context. In other words, adoption 
in general serves to establish "stray" identities in relation to an approved social 
unit; adoption in Woolf relies on this narration utterly, even without the body of the 
child over which to negotiate. 
This is where scholars like Judith Butler enter the critical discourse, to 
draw from Austin, Derrida, as well as Foucault, to address not only how language 
enacts a subject identity, but how social forces inform the citational quality of 
language that recognizes the subject. Thus, before I resume my reading of Woolf, 
I wish to invite both Butler (and, necessarily, her critics) into my already noisy 
conversation on adoption, substitution, and performativity. If a subject exists 
through iterable citation, does that subject exist outside citation as well—in the 
flesh, so to speak? Such was the worry over Butler's initial study, Gender Trouble 
(1990) which in its attempt to disrupt gender categories, seems to sever the 
biological or "innate" from the discursive reality of a subject: "There is no gender 
identity," she writes here, "behind the expression of gender."48 But Butler's next 
book, Bodies that Matter (1993), attempts, even in its title, to address the concern 
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that her deconstructionist tendencies might disembody living identities. The 
introduction, more specifically, tempers the original force of Gender Trouble by 
asking: "What are the constraints by which bodies are materialized as 'sexed,' and 
how are we to understand the 'matter' of sex, and of bodies more generally, as the 
repeated and violent circumscription of cultural intelligibility?"49 Identity, thus, is 
fleshed-out, but through a violent regulatory process. 
Albee exaggerates precisely this tension between the discursive and the 
material when, for example, he deflates Honey's hysterical pregnancy and 
undermines her femininity in the process. The physical sterility of all four 
characters in ^oo/fmediates the potency of their discursive selves. Bodies and 
language, as we have already seen in The American Dream, are violently 
intertwined for Albee. Whether or not we can agree that Woolf is a "speech-act 
play," as Stanley Fish deems Coriolanus, we can be certain that Woolf is & speech-
driven play, noted for its barbed language.50 The primary physical action is the 
arrival and departure of George and Martha's post-party guests, the new faculty 
member Nick and his "silly" wife Honey, who after an evening of cruel dialogue 
and some off-stage adultery, retreat (as if from battle) sometime before dawn. 
When Leonard Leff traces the play's adaptation into film, he uncovers numerous 
aborted attempts to infuse the dialogue with physical activity. Only the "roadhouse 
scene" remains from this Hollywood thirst for action; the rest of the story revolves 
around the bar in George and Martha's living room. Leff also finds many places 
where Albee's "caustic" language is restored from earlier, gentler screenplays, 
concluding that: "Virginia Woolj'was a commercial project whose notoriety was 
strongly tied to its language."51 
In the play itself, however, dependence on language is introduced as a 
criticism: "You didn't do anything," complains Martha to George when they return 
from a faculty party at the beginning of the play, "you never do anything; you 
never mix. You just sit around and talk"52 This is the same complaint, you may 
recall, that Nancy files in "Seascape" after Charlie retires: "We are not going to be 
around forever, Charlie, and you may not do nothing . . . " she insists, making the 
most of a double negative to incite her woefully stagnant partner.53 The critique in 
Woolf "is likewise ironic, since both George and Martha, like Nancy, do plenty with 
their talk. They play; they incite; they wound; they even conceive and kill which 
stirs the audience to wonder, just how do they do it? 
To begin with, there are simple exchanges in the play which practically 
mimic Austin's examples of the "overt performative." For example, just as Martha 
is about to recount to Nick and Honey the downward trajectory of George's 
academic career, he cuts in: 
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GEORGE 
I warn you. 
MARTHA {Incredulous) 
You what? 
GEORGE (Very quietly) 
I warn you.... 
MARTHA 
I stand warned!...54 
The warning "stands," despite Martha's decision to defy it. There's a context and 
a convention at work here, not only according to our general understanding of what 
it means to warn, but also according to an implicit understanding between George 
and Martha. For her to continue her train of speech would be to invite retaliation 
on his part. Something happens at this moment, if only in the words themselves. 
Action, at the beginning of the play, is so utterly discursive that Martha can only 
recognize George in language: "I swear . . . if you existed, I'd divorce you . . . ," 
she threatens in the opening scene.55 She senses that to enact the overt 
performative, "divorce," she would have to base it in a physical reality that both 
characters are afraid of—a reality that includes sterility and decay. In this way, the 
talk substitutes for more literal losses. As the play progresses, however, the 
physical will creep into the night, so to speak, and weaken the structure of George 
and Martha's discursive relationship, breaking down their defenses. 
Until that time, dialogue takes on some obvious characteristics of action: 
"Martha and I are merely . . . exercising . . . that's all . . . we're merely walking 
what's left of our wits," explains George.56 Even if the "performatives" are not so 
"overt," things are constantly happening in language. Groundrules are being laid 
out and dismissed, scenarios are woven and unraveled, games are played to keep 
these characters "fit" since they have no other "fruitful" activity in their lives. 
During one such "exercise," in which Nick is materialized as a "personal screwing 
machine," Honey covers her ears: "Dear, you mustn't . . . you mustn't. . . you 
mustn't. . . such language . . . ,"57 In this scene, Honey's more afraid of the words 
her husband utters than the reality of his adulterous potential. It's through dialogue 
that both conception and deception take place. The presence of an alternate reality 
beneath the discourse, however, lends force to the performative. Louis Paul 
describes this "alternate reality" as grief in his "game analysis" of Woolf. 
. . . one of these life games, Our Son the Pretend Child, is of 
special interest because it points to a major defect in identity, the 
lack of procreation and generativity, which is repaired by 
imaginary restitution; and that this game or life project or script 
represses a core of grief.58 
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It is the presence in absence, the ghost of all four character's short-comings, that 
enacts the performative, that seeks out substitutions for painful losses, that adopts 
an imaginary child to rally around. 
In her essay "Burning Acts," Judith Butler explains the parameters of 
performativity: "It is not simply that the speech act takes place within a practice, 
but that the act is itself a ritualized practice."59 So thus while all language has 
"play," perhaps there is a dimension of language—the ritualized practice—that 
enhances this play. Indeed, game theory corroborates: "Following Berne," writes 
Paul, "'game' is taken as a serious technical term denoting an ongoing, reciprocal, 
stereotyped relationship between two or more people unfolding toward a well-
defined, predictable outcome and having an ulterior or unconscious motive."60 
George and Martha ritualize the discursive existence of their child as a game. They 
practice it, however, to the same perilous potential of all text: "Writing," explains 
Foucault in "What is an Author," "unfolds like a game (Jeu) that invariably goes 
beyond its own rules and transgresses its limits."61 The performative sense of child 
survives in tact only as long as both parents (or authors) exist. Once they cease to 
exist as parents/authors, the ritual unfolds as narrative, as "orphaned speech." 
Martha transgresses the boundaries of the ritual, by first mentioning 
"sonny-Jim" to others, then by seducing Nick as a son-figure (a doubly illicit act). 
By the end of a long night of discursive torture, physical violence begins to bleed 
into the dialogue as the text reaches beyond its verbal limits. So that after Martha 
seduces Nick (and verbal play becomes sexual play), George sets the stage for his 
retaliation with pointed physical abuse: 
(Grabbing her hair, pulling her head back) 
Now, you listen to me, Martha; you have had quite an 
evening . . . quite a night for yourself, and you just can't cut it 
off whenever you've got enough blood in your mouth. We are 
going on, and I'm going to have at you, and it's going to make 
your performance tonight look like an Easter pageant. . .62 
In this passage, the threat of both physical and verbal violence is symbolized by the 
"blood" in Martha's mouth. George then transgresses the text of parenthood by 
"killing" their son in a narrative about a car accident—a narrative he has been 
constructing for some time in the form of a novel or perhaps an autobiography 
(we're never quite sure). When (and if) George didkiW his parents (according to 
that original script), that destruction enabled his writing power—the orphaned text 
could unfold, until a new father figure (Martha's father) emerges to stop its 
publication (by adopting and destroying it). 
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By using the story that disabled his academic rise, George attacks the 
Father as a governing institution, destroying not only himself as father, and 
referring perhaps quite literally to the death of his own father, but also by defying 
Martha's father as author of his dead-end career. Thus, the old narrative unfolds: 
Martha . . . {Longpause). . . our son is . . . dead. 
(Silence) 
(A tiny chuckle) on a country road, with his learner's permit in 
his pocket, he swerved, to avoid a porcupine, and drove into 
a. . . 
Martha interrupts with "rigid fury"63—"YOU...CAN'T... DO.. .THAT!"— 
underscoring the performative for us. George is not here describing an event that 
took place outside of language (even if he is, on one level describing a true event), 
he is doing something with his words that is intensely painful to Martha. In 
response, she tries desperately to save the "family" and keep the game going, not 
by resuscitating the "son" per se, but by insisting that even in death, he is a part of 
their lives. Through a poignant description of her son's invisible hands, she 
authors a counter-narrative that recalls the collusion between her and George to 
nurture their child as a defense: 
and as he grew . . . oh! so wise! . . . he walked evenly between 
us . . . these hands, still, to hold us off a bit, for mutual 
protection, to protect us all from George's . . . weakness . . . and 
my . . . necessary greater strength . . . to protect himself... and 
us.64 
Martha's story is really a confession, revealing how their "son" has always 
functioned to defer their failure, to stave-off the pain, the presence, of their empty 
existence. George's bitterly cruel comment, "There's areal mother talking," shows 
no mercy. The "play" is over. The violence of "Sonny-Jim'" s deconstruction, the 
collision, thus counter-balances the power of the construction, the collusion. 
"Man," according to Fish's reading of Coriolanus, cannot author himself 
(or his paternity) outside the regulatory schema that determines cultural 
intelligibility.65 George is no exception to this conundrum, and he knows it. Walter 
Davis's exhaustive psychoanalytic rendering of the play in Get the Guests (1994), 
isolates George's reaction to existential and Oedipal failure as a key catalyst to 
Albee's vicious finale. After Martha's own electra dilemma prompts her to deny 
George's paternity of their "child": 
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The question Who is the Father? deepens the instabilities of 
George's present situation, for the essential definition he offers 
of fatherhood is revenge. In doing so, he reveals his present 
purpose: to repeat, with the surrogate son, roles reversed, what 
Martha's father did to him.66 
Basically, George annihilates father and son. He authors himself in his 
"autobiography" and his child in his and Martha's "game," but the structures and 
forces that permit that construction are both self-perpetuating and self-dissolving. 
"Truth and illusion. Who knows the difference, eh, toots? Eh?" quips 
George to an increasingly baffled Nick.67 The fuzziness of reality deepens the 
performative: "The possibility of truth depends on the possibility of falseness," 
explains Petry, "and successfully performative language cannot be true for the 
compelling reason that it cannot be false."68 George and Martha's exchanges 
during the night have been neither true nor false, but sustaining in a way that breaks 
down ultimately, leaving them and us empty and exhausted with the effort. What 
can this tragedy tell us about adoptive subjectivity? The elaborate nurturing and 
painful erasure of "Sonny-Jim" recalls Schneider's emphasis on the role of 
language in maintaining the "cultural units" that govern kinship. What Woolf 
contributes is an exaggeration of the adoptee's invisibility as a "unit" lacking the 
affirmation of biology, a unit so vulnerable, even its absence couldn't prevent its 
demise. It also locates the "presence" of adoptive subjectivity in loss, as in The 
Zoo Story, only this time the loss is tied to parents who persist in "framing" an 
empty family portrait. 
The possibility that people could, in this way, conceive and kill 
discursively was unsettling to many reviewers of the original production of Woolf. 
Such vicious verbiage, they insisted, should be kept private, even locked up: 
u[Woolf\ is a sick play about sick people," wrote Robert Coleman for the New York 
Mirror. "They are neurotic, cruel and nasty... They really belong in a sanitarium 
for the mentally ill rather than on a stage."69 As if George and Martha were 
conscious of their audience, not actors but real people performing their lives for us, 
Coleman relegates them to an asylum for characters unfit for drama. The remark, 
however, is somewhat consistent with Albee's sense that the adoptee in Woolf 'is 
merely "metaphorical," whereas he, the author, is real. Where do George and 
Martha fit into his continuum of reality? They are clearly not metaphorical in the 
script, and yet they are the figurative product of Albee's imagination. If they are 
real enough to confuse critics, why can't their "son" (the figurative product of'their 
imagination) be real too?70 If only the parent ("author") exists to imagine the child, 
is Albee more real as an adoptee . . . or as an author? 
A phoniness or absence of "real values" is, perhaps, what underscores the 
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perceived reality ox presence behind these "sick" characters. Neither George and 
Martha nor Nick and Honey are able to author their parenthood outside the 
regulatory schema, or "normative" kinship model that simultaneously condemns 
them as sterile. George and Martha may construct their child, but their 
infertility—literal and symbolic—is a preexisting condition that audience members 
could recognize on many levels. Indeed, a common thread of both social and 
physical sterility runs throughout the dysfunctional families in Albee's plays. 
Herein lie yawning absences, but it's also possible to find adoptees (also literal and 
symbolic) languishing, half-expressed, on the margins of these dramas. My 
bastardization of "presence in absence" is designed to posit how adoption, as a 
performative requires the subject to "slip," but not without a trace. We must 
further ask why adoption, in particular, is so highly regulated, why the containment 
of the adoptive identity is designed to expunge that trace, to keep the "fourth child" 
from materializing. It may be worth considering too why Albee, a highly prolific 
author and adoptee, gives all the dialogue to his parents, who then hang themselves 
with their sardonic lines—even in this, the adoptee's voice as author, is present in 
absence. 
When art begins to hurt...when art begins to hurt, 
it's time to look around. Yes it is. 
—from Box 
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